To choose a multi-winner rule, i.e., a voting rule that selects a subset of k alternatives based on preferences of a certain population, is a hard and ambiguous task. Depending on the context, it varies widely what constitutes an "optimal" committee. In this paper, we offer a new perspective to measure the quality of committees and-consequently-multi-winner rules. We provide a quantitative analysis using methods from the theory of approximation algorithms and estimate how well multi-winner rules approximate two extreme objectives: diversity as captured by the (Approval) Chamberlin-Courant rule (CC) and individual excellence as captured by Approval Voting (AV). With both theoretical and experimental methods we establish a classification of multi-winner rules in terms of their quantitative alignment with these two opposing objectives.
Introduction
A multi-winner rule is a voting rule that selects a fixed-size subset of alternatives, a so-called committee. More formally, it is a function that given a set of objects, preferences of a population of voters over these objects, and an integer k, returns a subset of exactly k objects. Multi-winner rules can be used for selecting a representative body such as a parliament or university senate [14, 21] , for shortlisting candidates (e.g., in a competition) [7] , in a design of search engines [16, 47] and other recommendation systems [45] , and as mechanisms for facility location [22] . Ideally, a multi-winner rule should select the "best" committee, but the suitability of a chosen committee strongly depends on the specific context. For instance, if voters are experts (e.g., judges in a sport competition) whose preferences reflect their estimates of the objective qualities of candidates, then the goal is typically to pick k individually best candidates, e.g., those candidates that receive the highest scores from judges. Intuitively, in this and similar scenarios the quality of candidates can be assessed separately, and a suitable multi-winner rule should pick the k best-rated ones. On the contrary, if the voters are citizens and the goal is to choose locations for k public facilities (say, hospitals), then our goal is very different: instead of building all the facilities in one densely populated area, we would rather spread them in order to ensure that as many citizens as possible have access to some facility in their vicinity.
These two examples illustrate two very different requirements for multi-winner rules, which can be informally described as follows [21] : Diversity requires that a rule should select a committee which represents as many voters as possible; this translates to a hospital distribution that covers as many citizens as possible. Individual excellence suggests picking those candidates that individually receive the highest total support from the voters; this translates to choosing a group of best athletes in the previous example. However, many real-life scenarios do not fall clearly into one of the two categories. In these cases a mechanism designer would be interested in choosing a rule that guarantees some degree of diversity and individual excellence at the same time, putting more emphasis on either of them depending on the particular context. Consequently, to properly match rules with specific applications, it is essential to understand to which degree committees chosen by established multi-winner rules are diverse or individually excellent. In this paper we develop a set of tools that allows one to better understand the nature of multi-winner rules and to assess their tradeoff between diversity and individual excellence, and provide a classification that clarifies the behavior of these rules. In this work we focus on the case where voters express their preferences by providing subsets of approved candidates (the so-called approval-based model), yet our approach is applicable to other models of preferences as well.
Methodology and Contribution
In our approach we adopt ideas from theoretical computer science, in particular the concept of approximation, and use it in a novel way to assess properties of voting rules. Specifically, we identify two multi-winner rules, the Chamberlin-Courant rule (CC) and Multi-winner Approval Voting (AV), as distinctive representatives of the principles of diversity and individual excellence, respectively. By investigating how well certain rules approximate AV and CC, we provide guarantees of how diverse (resp. individually excellent) these rules are. Such approximation guarantees could be viewed as quantitative properties, which measure the degree of diversity and individual excellence of the studied rules. This is quite different from the traditional axiomatic approach of investigating properties of voting rules (and decision systems, in general), where the outcome of an analysis is binary: a rule can either satisfy a property or not. Our approach provides much more fine-grained information and allows to estimate the degree to which a certain property is satisfied. With this methods, we understand voting rules as a compromise between different (often contradictory) goals.
Our main contribution lies in developing a new method for appraising multi-winner rules. Specifically, we provide two types of analyses for a number of multi-winner rules:
1. In Section 3 we derive theoretical upper bounds on how much an outcome of the considered multi-winner rules can differ from the outcomes of CC and AV. We call these bounds CC-guarantee and AV-guarantee. These can be interpreted as worst-case guarantees for diversity and individual excellence, where the worst case is over all possible preference profiles. Our guarantees are given as functions of the committee size k and return values between 0 and 1. Intuitively, a higher CC-guarantee (resp. AV-guarantee) indicates a better performance in terms of diversity (resp. individual excellence), where 1 denotes that the rule performs as good as CC (resp., AV). Table 1 : Summary of worst-case guarantees for the considered multi-winner election rules. The guarantees are functions of the committee size k. A higher value means a better guarantee, with 1 denoting the optimal one. In most cases we could only find (accurate) estimates instead of the exact values of the guarantees: the "lower" and "upper" values in the table denote that the respective guarantee is between these two values. study yielding approximation ratios for actual data sets. In the extensive series of experiments we estimate how on average the outcomes of the considered rules differ from the outcomes of CC and AV.
In Section 5 we complement our results with an analysis of the axiom of efficiency, which can be viewed as an incarnation of Pareto efficiency, in the context of multi-winner elections. We say that a committee W 1 dominates a committee W 2 if each voter approves as many members of W 1 as of W 2 and some voter approves strictly more members of W 1 than of W 2 . Efficiency says that a rule should never select a dominated committee; thus efficiency could be viewed as a basic axiom for individual excellence. Since efficiency appears very fundamental, we were quite surprised to discover that some known rules (in particular, the Monroe rule and all sequential rules) do not satisfy this property. The result of this analysis is also summarized in Table 1 .
Our most important findings can be summarized as follows. Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) achieves the best compromise between AV and CC; this can be observed both from theoretical and experimental results. The sequential rules seq-PAV and Phragmén's rule, however, achieve almost the same quality while being polynomial-time computable (in contrast to PAV [6, 45] ). Also, the 2-Geometric rule achieves a very good compromise although slightly favors diversity over individual excellence. More generally, we show that the p-Geometric rule spans the whole spectrum from AV to CC, controlled through the parameter p.
Related Work
The normative study of multi-winner election rules typically focuses on axiomatic analysis. For approval-based rules a number of axioms describing proportionality have been recently identified and explored, in particular in the context of the rules that we study in this paper [3, 5, 11, 30, 41, 42, 47] . Similar properties for the ordinal model have been discussed by Dummett [15] , Elkind et al. [19] , Aziz et al. [4] and in the original works by Monroe [35] and Chamberlin and Courant [14] ; and for the model with weak preferences by Baumeister et al. [8] . For a survey on properties of multi-winner rules, with the focus on the ideas of individual excellence, diversity, and proportionality, we refer the reader to the book chapter by Faliszewski et al. [21] .
Another approach to understanding the nature of and the differences between various multiwinner rules is to analyze how these rules behave on certain subdomains of preferences, where their behavior is much easier to interpret, e.g., on two-dimensional geometric preferences [18] , on party-list profiles [12] , or on single-peaked and single-crossing domains [4] . Other approaches include analyzing certain aspects of multi-winner rules in specifically-designed probabilistic models [29, 32, 39, 43] , quantifying their regret and distortion in utilitarian models [13] , assessing their robustness [10] , and evaluating them based on data collected from surveys [40, 49] .
We conclude this brief overview by mentioning other approaches in the normative analysis of single-winner voting rules, but which, to the best of our knowledge, have not been yet adopted in the multi-winner context. In distance rationalization [20] the main idea is to identify a class of "consensus" preference profiles where the winning candidates can be pointed out unambiguously, and to view election rules as procedure that given an arbitrary preference profile P look for the closest (according to some metric) consensus profile P c and define the winning candidates for P as those for P c . In the analysis of distortion in metric spaces [1, 2, 22, 23, 24, 44] , one assumes that the voters and the candidates can be represented as points in some issue space and that the best candidate is the one that minimizes the total distance to the voters. In this approach one views election rules as procedures that try to guess the best candidate having only incomplete information (preference orders instead of distances), and the rules are compared with respect to how well they can guess the best candidate. A quantitative analysis (involving mostly experiments) of similarities between certain single-winner election rules has been initiated by Klamler [26, 27, 28] and Eckert et al. [17] . Finally, Laslier and Van der Straeten performed live experiments involving various election systems [31] .
Preliminaries
For a natural number t ∈ N, let [t] represent the set {1, . . . , t}. For a set X, we write S(X) to denote the powerset of X, i.e., the set of all subsets of X, and by S k (X) we denote the set of all k-element subsets of X.
Let C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } and N = {1, . . . , n} be sets of m candidates and n voters, respectively.
Voters reveal their preferences by indicating which candidates they like: by A(i) ⊆ C we denote the approval set of voter i (i.e., the set of candidates that i approves of). For a candidate c, by N (c) ⊆ N we denote the set of voters who approve c. Given a set of candidates X ⊆ C, we write N (X) to denote the set of voters who approve at least one candidate in X, i.e., N (X) = {i ∈ N : X ∩ A(i) = ∅}. We call the collection of approval sets A = (A(1), A(2), . . . , A(n)) an approval profile. Further, we use the symbol A to represent the set of all approval profiles. We call the elements of S k (C) size-k committees. Hereinafter, we will always use the symbol k to represent the desired size of the committee to be elected. An approval-based committee rule (in short, an ABC rule) is a function R : A × N → S(S k (C)) that takes as an input an approval profile and an integer k ∈ N (the required committee size), and returns a set of size-k committees. 1 Below, we recall the definitions of ABC rules which are the objects of our study.
Multi-winner Approval Voting (AV). This rule selects k candidates which are approved by most voters. More formally, for a profile A the AV-score of committee W is defined as sc av (A, W ) = c∈W N (c), and AV selects committees W that maximizes sc av (A, W ).
Approval Chamberlin-Courant (CC). For a profile A we define the CC-score of a committee W as sc cc (A, W ) = i∈N min 1, |A(i) ∩ W | ; CC outputs argmax W sc cc (A, W ). Intuitively, CC aims at finding a committee W such that as many voters as possible have their representatives in W (a representative of a voter is a candidate that she approves of). The CC rule was first mentioned by Thiele [48] , and then introduced and discussed in a more general context by Chamberlin and Courant [14] .
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV). PAV was first proposed by Thiele [48] : it selects committees with the highest PAV-scores, defined as sc pav (A, W ) = i∈N H (|W ∩ A(i)|), where H(t) is the t-th harmonic number, i.e., H(t) = t i=1 1 /i. By using the harmonic function H(·), voters who already have more representatives in the committee get less voting power than those with fewer representatives. While using other concave functions instead of H(·) would give similar effects, the harmonic function is particularly well justified-this function implies a number of appealing properties of the rule [3] , and in particular it allows one to view PAV as an extension of the famous d'Hondt method [12, 30] . p-Geometric. This rule, introduced by Skowron et al. [45] , can be described similarly to PAV. The difference is that it uses an exponentially decreasing function instead of the harmonic function to describe the relation between the voting power of individual voters and the number of their approved representatives in the committee. Formally, for a given parameter p ≥ 1 the p-geometric rule assigns to each committee W the score sc p-geom (A, W ) = i∈N |A(i)∩W | j=1 1 p j , and picks the committees with the highest scores. It is easy to see that the 1-geometric rule is simply Multi-winner Approval Voting.
Sequential CC/AV/PAV/p-Geometric. For each rule R ∈ {CC, AV, PAV, p-geometric}, we define its sequential variant, denoted as seq-R, as follows. We start with an empty solution W = ∅ and in each of the k consecutive steps we add to W a candidate c that maximizes sc R (A, W ∪ {c}), i.e., the candidate that improves the committee's score most. In case of ties we use a lexicographic tie-breaking.
Monroe. Monroe's rule [35] , similarly to CC, aims at maximizing the number of voters who are represented in the elected committee. The difference is that for calculating the score of a committee, Monroe additionally imposes that each candidate should be responsible for representing roughly the same number of voters. Formally, a Monroe assignment of the voters to a committee W is a function φ : N → W such that each candidate c ∈ W is assigned roughly the same number of voters, i.e., that n /k ≤ |φ −1 (c)| ≤ n /k . Let Φ(W ) denote the set of all possible Monroe assignments to W . The Monroe-score of W is defined as sc Monroe (A, W ) = max φ∈Φ(W ) i∈N |A(i) ∩ {φ(i)}|; the Monroe rule returns committees with the highest Monroe-score.
Greedy Monroe [46] . This is a sequential variant of the Monroe's rule. It proceeds in k steps: In each step it selects a candidate c and a group G of n /k or n /k not-yet removed voters 2 so that |N (c) ∩ G| is maximal; next candidate c is added to the winning committee and the voters from G are removed from the further consideration.
Phragmén's Sequential Rule (seq-Phragmén). Perhaps the easiest way to define the family of Phragmén's rules [11, 25, 36, 37, 38] is by describing them as load distribution procedures. We assume that each selected committee member c is associated with one unit of load that needs to be distributed among those voters who approve c (though it does not have to be distributed equally). Phragmén's sequential rule proceeds in k steps. In each step it selects exactly one candidate and distributes its load in some specific way: let j (i − 1) denote the total load assigned to voter j just before the i-th step. In the i-th step the rule selects a candidate c and finds a load distribution {x j : j ∈ N } that satisfies the following three conditions: (i) x j > 0 implies that c ∈ A(j), (ii) j∈N x j = 1 (iii) the maximum load assigned to a voter, max j∈N j (i − 1) + x j , is minimized. The new total load assigned to a voter j ∈ N after the i-th step is j (i) = j (i − 1) + x j .
Worst-Case Guarantees of Multi-winner Rules
The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and Approval Voting represent two extreme points in the spectrum of multi-winner rules [12, 18, 21, 30] . Specifically, CC and AV are prime examples of rules aiming at diversity, and at individual excellence, respectively. For a detailed discussion on these two principles we refer the reader to the book chapter of Faliszewski et al. [21] , but below we also include a simple example which illustrates the difference between AV and CC. In short, AV cares about selecting candidates who receive the highest total support from the population of voters, and CC cares mostly about representing the minorities in the elected committee. In this section we analyze the multi-winner rules from Section 2 with respect to how well they perform in terms of diversity, and individual excellence. In our study we use the well-established idea of approximation from computer science, but in a new way: by estimating how well a given rule R approximates CC (resp., AV), we quantify how R performs with respect to diversity (resp., individual excellence). This is different from the typical use of the idea of approximation in the following aspects: (i) We are not interested in finding new algorithms approximating a given objective function as well as possible, but rather in establishing how well the existing known rules approximate given functions (even if it is apparent that better and simpler approximation algorithms exist, these algorithms might not share other important properties of the considered rules). (ii) We are not approximating computationally hard rules with rules which are easier to compute. On contrary, we will be investigating how computationally hard rules (such as PAV, Monroe, etc.) approximate AV, which is an easy to compute rule. Definition 1. Recall that for a profile A, sc av (A, W ) and sc cc (A, W ) denote the AV-score and CC-score of committee W , respectively. The AV-guarantee of an ABC rule R is a function κ av : N → [0, 1] that takes as input an integer k, representing the size of the committee, and is defined as:
.
Analogously, the CC-guarantee of R is defined by
The AV and CC-guarantees can be viewed as quantitative properties of multi-winner rules. Instead of traditional binary properties, which can be either satisfied or not, quantitative properties provide much more fine-grained information regarding the behavior of a rule with respect to some normative criterion. Also, the AV-and CC-guarantee can be viewed as approximation ratios of voting rules subject to AV and CC. In the remaining part of this section we will evaluate the previously defined rules against their AV and CC guarantees.
Guarantees for CC and AV
Clearly, the AV-guarantee of Approval Voting and the CC-guarantee of the Chamberlin-Courant rule are the constant-one function. Below we establish the AV-guarantee of CC and vice versa.
Proof. Consider an approval profile A, and let W av be an AV-winning committee for A. We know that W av contains a candidate who is approved by most voters-let us call such a candidate c max .
Clearly, it holds that sc cc (A, W av ) ≥ |N (c max )|. Further, for any size-k committee W ⊆ C we have that sc cc (A, W ) ≤ k|N (c max )|, which proves that the AV-guarantee of CC is at least 1 /k. To see that the guarantee cannot be higher than 1 /k consider a family of profiles where the set of voters can be divided into k disjoint groups: N 1 , N 2 , . . . , N k , with |N 1 | = x + 1 and |N i | = x for i ≥ 2, for some large value x. Assume that m = k 2 and that all voters from N i approve candidates c (i−1)k+1 , c (i−1)k+2 , . . . c ik . For this profile AV selects committee {c 1 , . . . c k } with the CC-score equal to x + 1. The optimal CC committee is e.g., {c 1 , c k+1 , . . . , c k(k−1)+1 }, with the CC-score equal to kx + 1.
Proposition 2. The AV-guarantee of CC and sequential CC is 1 /k.
Proof. For an approval profile A let W cc and W av be committees winning according to CC and AV, respectively. We will first prove that sc av (A, W cc ) ≥ scav(A,Wav) k . If it was not the case, then by the pigeonhole principle, there would exists a candidate c ∈ W av such that sc av (A, W cc ) < sc av (A, {c}). However, this means that a committee that consists of c and any k − 1 candidates has a higher CC-score than W cc , a contradiction. Thus, the AV guarantee of CC is at least 1 /k. For seq-CC, the same argument by contradiction applies as this candidate c would have been chosen in the first round.
To see that this guarantee cannot be higher than 1 /k consider the following profile: assume there are x voters (x is a large integer) who approve candidates c 1 , . . . , c k . Further, for each candidate c k+1 , . . . , c 2k there is a single voter who approves only her. The CC-winning committee is {c 1 , c k+1 . . . , c 2k−1 } with the AV-score of x + k − 1. However, the AV-score of committee {c 1 , . . . c k } is xk, and for large enough x the ratio x+k−1 xk can be made arbitrarily close to 1 /k. Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 give a baseline for our further analysis. In particular, we would expect that "good" rules implementing a tradeoff between diversity and individual excellence, should have AV and CC-guarantees better than 1 /k.
We conclude this section by noting that the CC-guarantee of the sequential Chamberlin-Courant rule is 1 − (1 − 1 /k) k (which approaches 1 − 1 /e ≈ 0.63 for large k). This is the result of the fact that sequential CC is a 1 − (1 − 1 /k) k -approximation algorithm for CC [33] .
An Optimal Proportional Compromise
Next, we examine what are the possible AV and CC guarantees that a proportional rule could achieve. We consider a very weak definition of proportionality, called lower quota. Definition 2. We call a profile A a party-list profile if for each pair of voters i, j ∈ N it holds that either A(i) ∩ A(j) = ∅ or that A(i) = A(j). For a given committee size k we say that a group of voters V ⊆ N is -cohesive, if |V | ≥ n k and i∈V A(i) ≥ . An ABC rule R satisfies lower quota if for each party-list profile A, each k ∈ N and each -cohesive group of voters V ⊆ N it holds that at least members of each winning committee from R(A, k) are approved by the members of V .
We obtain the following two upper bounds on the guarantees of proportional rules. Proposition 3. The AV-guarantee of a rule that satisfies lower quota is at most equal to 2
Proof. Let us fix k, and consider the following approval-based profile A with n = k · x voters divided into k equal-size groups: 
On the other hand, one can observe that W av = {x 1 , . . . , x k }, and so sc av (A, W av ) = √ k · x · k. As a result we have:
Proposition 4. The CC-guarantee of a rule that satisfies lower quota is at most equal to 3 4 + 3 8k−4 . Proof. Let R be a rule that satisfies lower quota. Consider a profile A with n = 2kx voters for some x ≥ 1. Each from the first kx voters approves candidates X = {x 1 , . . . , x k }. The other voters are divided into k equal-size groups, each approving a different candidate from the set Y = {y 1 , . . . , y k }. Lower quota ensures that at least k /2 candidates need to be chosen from X. Thus, the CC-score of a committee selected by R is at most equal to kx + kx 2 . By selecting one candidate from X and k − 1 candidates from Y we get a CC-score of 2kx − x. Thus, the CC-guarantee is at most equal to:
Guarantees for Monroe and Greedy Monroe
Let us turn our attention to the Monroe rule and its greedy variant. Since Monroe is often considered a proportional rule, one could expect that in terms of AV and CC-guarantees this rule is somehow between AV and CC. Surprisingly, this is not the case and in fact this rule does not offer a better AV-guarantee than CC.
Proposition 5. The AV-guarantee of Greedy Monroe and Monroe is 1 /k.
Proof. First, let us consider the greedy Monroe rule. To see the lower bound of 1 /k, let A be an approval profile and letc denote the candidate who is approved by most voters. For the sake of clarity we assume that k divides n; the proof can be generalized to hold for arbitrary n. Clearly, for any committee W it holds that sc av (A, W ) ≤ k|N (c)|. If |N (c)| ≤ n k , then the greedy Monroe rule in the first step will selectc. Otherwise, it will select some candidate approved by at least n k voters, and will remove n k of them from A. By a similar reasoning we can infer that in the second step the rule will pick a candidate who is approved by at least min n k , |N (c)| − n k voters; and in general, that in the i-th step the rule will pick the candidate who is approved by at least min n k , |N (c)| − n(i−1) k voters. As a result, we infer that number of voters that have at least one approved candidate in the chosen committee is at least
Hence the AV-guarantee of Greedy Monroe is at least 1 /k. To see that the same lower bound holds for the Monroe rule, we distinguish two cases; let W be a winning committee. Ifc ∈ W , then sc CC (A, W ) ≥ |N (c)| and we are done. Ifc / ∈ W and sc CC (A, W ) < |N (c)|, then there is a committee with a higher Monroe-score that containsc; a contradiction. Now, consider the following instance witnessing that the AV-guarantee of Greedy Monroe is at most 1 k . Let n = k · (x + 1) and let A be a profile with n voters. Let W ⊆ C with |W | = k and c 1 , . . . , c k / ∈ W . We define profile A as follows: we have x voters that approve W ∪ {c 1 } and one voter that approves only {c 1 }, we have x voters that approve W ∪ {c 2 } and one voter that approves only {c 2 }, etc. This defines in total k · (x + 1) voters. AV selects the committee W with an AV-score of xk 2 ; Greedy Monroe selects the committee {c 1 . . . , c k } with an AV-score of (x + 1)k. We have a ratio of (x+1) xk , which converges to 1 k for x → ∞. The same instance shows that the AV guarantee of the Monroe rule is at most 1 k . Proposition 6. The CC-guarantee of Monroe and greedy Monroe is between 1 2 and 1 2 + 1 k−1 . Proof. First, for the sake of contradiction let us assume that there exists a profile A where the CC-guarantee of Greedy Monroe is below 1 2 . Let W cc and W M be the committees winning in A according to CC and Greedy Monroe, respectively. Let φ be an assignment of the voters to the committee members obtained during the construction of W M ; we say that a voter is represented if it is assigned to a member of W M who she approves of. Since sc cc (A, W M ) < 1 2 · sc cc (A, W cc ), by the pigeonhole principle we infer that there exists a candidate c ∈ W cc \ W M who is approved by x unrepresented voters, where:
Similarly, by the pigeonhole principle we can infer that there exists a candidate c ∈ W M who is represented by at most sccc(A,W M ) k voters. Thus, Greedy Monroe would select c rather than c , a contradiction. A similar argument can be made to show that the CC-guarantee of the Monroe rule is ≥ 1 2 . Now, consider the following approval profile. There are 2k + 1 candidates, c 1 , . . . , c 2k+1 , and 2k disjoint equal-size groups of voters, N 1 , . . . , N 2k . For each i ∈ [2k], candidate c i is approved by all voters from N i . Candidate c 2k+1 is approved by all voters from N 1 ∪ . . . ∪ N k . One of the winning committees according to the Monroe and Greedy Monroe rule is {c 1 , . . . , c k−2 , c k+1 , c 2k+1 }, which has a CC-score of n k + (k − 1) n 2k . On the other hand, {c k+1 , . . . , c 2k−1 , c 2k+1 } has a CC-score of n − n k . Thus, the CC-guarantee of Monroe and Greedy Monroe is at most:
This completes the proof.
Guarantees for PAV
Let us now move to multi-winner voting systems offering asymptotically better guarantees than the (greedy) Monroe rule. As we will see, the examination of such rules requires a more complex combinatorial analysis. We start with Proportional Approval Voting.
Theorem 1. The AV-guarantee of PAV is between 1 2+ √ k and 2 √ k . Proof. First, we show that the AV-guarantee of PAV is at least equal to 1 2+ √ k . Consider an approval profile A and a PAV-winning committee W pav ; let n pav = |N (W pav )| denote the number of voters who approve some member of W pav . For each i ∈ N we set w i = |A(i) ∩ W pav |. Let W av be a committee with the highest AV-score. W.l.o.g., we can assume that W av = W pav . Now, consider a candidate c ∈ W av \ W pav with the highest AV-score, and let n c = |N (c)| denote the number of voters who approve c. If we replace a candidate c ∈ W pav with c, the PAV-score of W pav will change by:
Let us now compute the sum:
We know that for each c ∈ W we have ∆(c, c ) ≤ 0, thus k i∈N (c) 1 w i +1 − n pav ≤ 0 and i∈N (c) 1 w i +1 ≤ npav k . We can now use the inequality between harmonic and arithmetic mean to get that:
This can be reformulated as:
Now, let us consider two cases. If n pav ≤ n c √ k, then we observe that:
On the other hand, if n pav ≥ n c √ k, then:
In either case we have that scav(A,Wpav) scav(A,Wav) ≥ 1 2+ √ k . This yields a lower bound on the AV-guarantee of PAV.
The fact that the AV-guarantee of PAV is at most equal to 2 √ k − 1 k follows from Proposition 3 and the fact that PAV satisfies lower-quota [12] .
Theorem 2. The CC-guarantee of PAV is between 1 2 and 1 2 + 1 4k−2 . Proof. We first prove a lower bound of 1 /2 for the CC-guarantee of PAV. Consider an approvalbased profile A and a PAV winning committee W pav . Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 1, for each voter i ∈ N we set w i = |A(i) ∩ W pav |. Let W cc be a committee winning according to the Chamberlin-Courant rule For each two candidates, c ∈ W pav and c ∈ W cc , let ∆(c , c) denote the change of the PAV-score of W pav due to replacing c with c . By Inequality (1), we have:
Let us now consider an arbitrary bijection τ : W pav → W cc , matching members of W pav with the members of W cc . We compute the sum:
Since W pav is an PAV-optimal committee, we know that for each c ∈ W pav , it holds that ∆(τ (c), c) ≤ 0. Consequently, c∈Wpav ∆(τ (c), c) ≤ 0, and so we get that:
Consequently, we get that |N Wpav | ≥
, which show that the CC-guarantee of PAV is at least equal to 1 /2. Now, we will prove the upper bound using the following construction. Let n, the number of voters, be divisible by 2k. The set of candidates is X ∪ Y with X = {x 1 , . . . , x k } and Y = {y 1 , . . . , y k }. There are n /2 voters who approve X. Further, for each i ∈ [k], there are n 2k voters who approve candidate y i . All committees that contain at least k − 1 candidates from X are winning according to PAV, among them X itself. Committee X has a CC-score of n /2. The optimal CC committee consists of a single candidate from X and (k − 1) candidates from Y -this would give a CC-score of n 2 + (k − 1) · n 2k = n · 2k−1 2k . Thus, the CC-guarantee of PAV is at most equal to:
Guarantees for Sequential PAV
For sequential PAV we can prove qualitatively similar AV-guarantees to the ones for PAV. Proof. Since sequential PAV satisfies lower quota [12] , the upper bound of 2 √ k − 1 k follows from Proposition 1. In the remaining part of the proof we will prove the lower-bound.
For k = 1, seq-PAV is AV and hence the Av-guarantee is 1. For k = 2, in the first step the AV-winner is chosen and hence we have an AV-guarantee for k = 2 is 3 4 ≥ 1 2 √ 2 . Now assume that k ≥ 3. Let W (j) pav denote the first j candidates selected by sequential PAV; in particular, W (0) pav = ∅. Let w j denote the candidate selected by sequential PAV in the jth step, thus w j is the single candidate in the set W
Next, let W av be the optimal committee according to Approval Voting, and let s av = sc av (W av ).
If at some step j of the run of sequential PAV, it happens that the AV-score of W (j) pav , which is i∈N x i,j , is greater or equal than sav 2 √ k , then our hypothesis is clearly satisfied. Thus, from now on, we assume that for each j we have that i∈N x i,j < sav 2 √ k . Also, this means that in each step there exists a candidate c from W av \ W pav who is approved by n c ≥
Let ∆p j denote the increase of the PAV-score due to adding w j+1 to W (j) pav . Using the inequality between harmonic and arithmetic mean, we have that:
Since this must hold in each step of sequential PAV, we get that the total PAV-score of W (k) pav must be at least equal to k · sav 2k √ k = sav 2 √ k . Since the AV-score is at least equal to the PAV-score of any committee, we obtain a contradiction and conclude that sc av (A, W
Let us now discuss the CC-guarantee of sequential PAV. One can observe that the construction for PAV from Theorem 2 also works for sequential PAV, which shows that the CC-guarantee of seq-PAV is at most equal to 1 2 + 1 4k−2 . Proposition 7 below establishes a lower bound. In this case however, the gap between the lower and upper bounds on the CC-guarantee of the rule is large. Finding a more accurate estimate remains an interesting open question. Proposition 7. The CC-guarantee of sequential PAV is at least equal to 1 log(k)+2 . Proof. Consider an approval profile A and let W spav and W cc denote the winning committees in A according to seq-PAV and CC, respectively. Let n spav = sc cc (A, W spav ) and n cc = sc cc (A, W cc ). The total PAV-score of W spav is at most equal to n spav H(k) ≤ n spav (log(k) + 1). Thus, at some step sequential PAV selected a committee member who improved the PAV-score by at most nspav(log(k)+1) k
. On the other hand, by the pigeonhole principle, we know that at each step of seq-PAV there exists a not-selected candidate whose selection would improve the PAV-score by at least ncc−nspav k . Consequently, we get that
After reformulation we have that n spav ≥ ncc log(k)+2 , which completes the proof.
Guarantees for p-Geometric Rule
The following two theorems estimate the guarantees for the p-geometric rule. These guarantees are visualized in Figure 1 . We can see that for p close to 1 we have a rule that approaches AV, whereas for larger p values we approach CC. Let us recall that W(·) denotes the Lambert W function. For each z it holds that z = W(z)e W(z) . Intuitively, W(·) is a function that asymptotically increases slower than the natural logarithm log. Proof. We use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 1 with a difference that instead of W pav (denoting a PAV winning committee) we will use W p-geom , denoting a committee winning according to the p-geometric rule. By repeating the reasoning from the proof of Theorem 1 instead of Inequality (2) we would obtain:
By using Jensen's inequality we get that i∈N (c)
Since we know that c ∈Wp-geom ∆(c, c ) ≤ 0, we have that:
Let us set r = knc i∈N w i , and observe (similarly as in the proof of Theorem 1) that scav(A,Wav) scav(A,Wp-geom) ≤ 1 + r. We have that p k r ≥ r. The equation p k r = r has only one solution, r = k log(p) W(k log(p)) . This gives r ≤ k log(p) W(k log(p)) and proves that the AV-guarantee is at least equal to W(k log(p)) k log(p)+W(k log(p)) . Now, let us prove the upper bound on the AV-guarantee. Let z = k log(p) W(k log(p)) ; in particular, by the properties of the Lambert function we have that z = p k z . Consider the following instance. Let x be a large integer so that x · z ≈ xz. (Formally, we choose an increasing sequencex so that zx − zx → 0.) Assume there are x · z voters who approve candidates B = {c 1 , . . . , c k }. Additionally, for each candidate c ∈ D = {c k+1 , . . . , c 2k } there are x distinct voters who approve c. For this instance the p-geometric rule selects at most k z members from B: if more candidates from B were selected, then replacing one candidate from B with a candidate from D would increase the p-geometric-score by more than
a contradiction. Thus, the AV-score of the committee selected by the p-geometric rule would be smaller than x · z · 1 + k z + kx = xz + 2kx. Thus, we get that the AV-guarantee of the p-geometric rule is at most equal to:
Theorem 5. The CC-guarantee of the p-geometric rule is between p−1 p and p p+ k k+2 .
Proof. Let A be an approval profile and let W cc and W p-geom be two committees winning according to the Chamberlin-Courant and p-geometric rule, respectively. Let n p-geom = sc cc (A, W p-geom ) and n cc = sc cc (A, W cc ). We observe that:
and that:
Consequently, from sc p-geom (A, W p-geom ) ≥ sc p-geom (A, W cc ) we get that:
which gives the lower bound on the CC-guarantee. Now, let us prove the upper bound. Fix a rational number p and some large integer x such that px is integer. First, let k be even with k = 2k . Let the set of candidates be {x 1 , . . . , x k } ∪ {y 1 , . . . , y k }. There are k groups of voters who consists of px voters; in each group voters approve some two distinct candidates from {x 1 , . . . , x k }. Additionally, there are k groups consisting of x voters who approve some distinct candidate from {y 1 , . . . , y k }. It is easy to see that for such instances the CC-guarantee is at most equal to k px k px+k x = p 1+p . Now, let k be odd with k = 2k + 1; the set of candidates is {x 1 , . . . , x 2k +2 } ∪ {y 1 , . . . , y k }. There are k + 1 groups of voters who consists of px voters; in each group voters approve some two distinct candidates from {x 1 , . . . , x 2k +2 }. Additionally, there are k groups consisting of x voters who approve some distinct candidate from {y 1 , . . . , y k }. Now, we see that the for such instances the CC-guarantee is at most equal to
The upper bound for the odd case is larger and hence prevails.
Guarantees for the Sequential Phragmén's Rule
Finally, we turn our attention to another rule aimed at implementing proportionality of representation, namely seq-Phragmén. Proof. First, we will prove the lower bound of 1 5 √ k+1 . Consider an approval profile A, and let W phrag and W av be committees winning according to seq-Phragmén and AV, respectively. W.l.o.g., we assume that W phrag = W av . For each iteration t we will use the following notation: 3. Let j (t) denote the total load assigned to voter j until t. The maximum load in iteration t is max j∈N j (t). 
Let
av ) j (t). We will use an argument based on a potential function Φ : [0, t] → R, which we maintain during each iteration of seq-Phragmén. Let Φ(0) = 0. In iteration t, we increase the potential function by 5
phrag and decrease it by n (t) av , i.e.,
Our goal is to show that Φ(k) ≥ 0. If we know that Φ(k) > 0, we can infer that
and hence the AV-guarantee of seq-Phragmén is lower-bounded by 1 5 √ k+1 . Let s be the first iteration where phrag , it can be ensured that the load does not increase above
, so seq-Phragmén would have chosen w (t) av , a contradiction. Next, observe that after w (t) phrag has been selected, the largest load assigned in total to a voter is at least equal to 1 /n (t) phrag . Yet, if w (t) av were selected, then the largest total load assigned to a voter would be at most equal to 
Now, we bound Φ(s − 1). Let w = w (s+1) av , i.e., let w be a candidate with the highest AV-score contained in W av \ {w (1) phrag , . . . , w (s) phrag }; let n w = |N (w)|. Here, we divide our reasoning into the following sequence of claims:
1. Observe that in step s, a candidate other than w is selected by seq-Phragmén and selecting candidate w would increase the maximum load by at most 1 /nw. As a consequence, in each iteration t ≤ s, the maximum load increased by at most 1 /nw.
2. We will show that the following holds: if the maximum load in N (w) increases by at least 2 /nw between two iterations t 1 and t 2 ≤ s, then the AV-score from voters in N (w) increased between these two iterations by at least nw 2 . Towards a contradiction, assume that this is not the case, i.e., that between t 1 and t 2 the maximum load from voter in N (w) increases by at least 2 /nw, and the load of more than nw /2 voters in N (w) does not increase. Without loss of generality, assume that t 2 is the first iteration for which our assumption holds. Then, if in t 2 we selected w and distributed its load among these more than nw /2 voters whose load has not yet increased, then the maximum load would increase by less than 2 /nw. This contradicts the fact that seq-Phragmén does not choose w (by definition of w).
3. Let us group the iterations of seq-Phragmén before s into blocks. The i-th block starts after the (i − 1)-th block ends (the first block starts with the first iteration). Further, each block ends right after the first iteration which increases the maximum load assigned to a voter from N (w) by at least 2 /nw since the moment the block has started (thus, the last iterations may not be part of a block). Thus, in each block the maximum load assigned to a voter from N (w) increases by at least 2 /nw. Since in one step the load can increase by no more than 1 /nw, in each block the maximum load assigned to a voter from N (w) increases by at most 2 /nw + 1 /nw = 3 /nw. Consequently, since k blocks. By the previous point, the total AV-score of voters increases in each block by at least nw /2. Since there are at least √ k blocks, we have that
By Equation (5), we have that
By choice of w, candidates not contained in W phrag are approved by at most n w voters and hence Φ(k) − Φ(s − 1) ≥ −kn w . Hence Φ(k) ≥ 0. This concludes the lower bound proof.
For the upper bound we observe that seq-Phragmén satisfies the lower quota property [12] and use Proposition 3. This completes the proof.
The next theorem shows that the CC-guarantee of seq-Phragmén is asymptotically equal to 1 2 .
Theorem 7. The CC-guarantee of seq-Phragmén is between 1 2 and 1 2 + 1 4k−2 . Proof. We first prove the lower bound on the CC-guarantee of seq-Phragmén. Consider an approval profile A, and let W phrag be a committee selected by seq-Phragmén for A; let W cc be a committee maximizing the CC-score for A. Further, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, by W (i) phrag we denote the first i candidates selected by seq-Phragmén. We set n cc = |N (W cc )| and n
We will show by induction that for each i it holds that n (i) phrag ≥ i·ncc k+i . For i = 0, the base step of the induction is trivially satisfied. Now, assume that for some i we have n (i) phrag ≥ i·ncc k+i , and we consider the (i + 1)-th step of seq-Phragmén. Observe that there exists a not-yet selected candidate c who is supported by at least ncc−n (i) phrag k voters who do not have yet a representative in W (i) phrag . Consider the following two cases:
Case 1: c is not selected in the (i + 1)-th step. After this step the maximum load assigned to a voter is at least equal to i+1
, which is the number of chosen candidates divided by the number of voters that share their load. By selecting c the load would increase to no more than
. This is equivalent to
. After reformulating we have:
By the inductive assumption we have n cc − n (i) phrag ≤ n cc − ncci k+i = ncck k+i and
In both cases the inductive step is satisfied, which shows that our hypothesis holds. In particular, for i = k, we have that n (k) phrag ≥ kncc k+k = ncc 2 . This proves the lower bound on the CC-guarantee of seq-Phragmén.
For the upper bound we use the same construction and argument as in the proof of Theorem 2.
Average Guarantees: Experimental Analysis
To complement the theoretical analysis of Section 4, we have run experiments that aim at assessing AV-ratios and CC-ratios achieved by several voting rules. These two ratios are perinstance analogues of AV-and CC-guarantee and are defined as follows: Given a voting rule R and a profile A, the AV-ratio is defined as
the CC-ratio is defined as
In these experiments, we have calculated the AV-and CC-ratios for real-world and randomly generated profiles and compared them for different voting rules. We have used two data sets: profiles obtained from preflib.org [34] and profiles generated via an uniform distribution (see details below)-we refer to these two as the preflib and uniform dataset.
Datasets. We restricted our attention to profiles where both the AV-ratio of CC and the CC-ratio of AV is at most 0.9. This excludes profiles in which a perfect or almost perfect compromise between AV and CC can be found. The uniform dataset consists of 500 profiles with 20 candidates and 50 voters, each. Voters' approval sets are of size 2-5 (chosen uniformly at random) and the approval sets of a given size are also chosen uniformly at random. Experiments for the uniform dataset use a committee size of k = 5.
The preflib dataset is based on preferences obtained from preflib.org. Since their database does not contain approval-based datasets, we extracted approval profiles from ranked ballots as follows: for each ranked profile and i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, we generate an approval profile assuming that voters approve all candidates that are ranked in the top i positions. As before, we excluded profiles that allowed an almost perfect compromise between AV and CC. For the preflib dataset we consider k ∈ {3, . . . , 7} and obtained a total number of 243 instances.
Results. We considered the following voting rules: AV, CC, seq-CC, PAV, seq-PAV, seq-Phragmén, Monroe's rule, as well as the 1.5-, 2-, and 5-Geometric rule. Our results are displayed as boxplots in Figure 2 for the preflib data set and in Figure 3 for the uniform dataset. The top and bottom of boxes represent the first and third quantiles, the middle red bar shows the median. The dashed intervals (whiskers) show the range of all values, i.e., the minimum and maximum AV-or CC-ratio. The results for the preflib and random data set are largely similar; we comment on their differences later on.
The main conclusion from the experiments is that the classification obtained from worst-case analytical bounds also holds in our (average case) experiments. PAV, seq-PAV, and seq-Phragmén perform very well with respect to the AV-ratio, beaten only by 1.5-Geometric and AV itself. This is mirrored by our theoretical results as only PAV, seq-PAV, and seq-Phragmén achieve a Θ( 1 / √ k) AV-guarantee. For the uniform data set, however, seq-Phragmén has slightly lower AV-ratios, but still comparable to PAV and seq-PAV. Also the 2-Geometric rule achieves comparable AV-ratios. Even better AV-ratios are achieved only by 1.5-Geometric and-by definition-by AV.
Considering the CC-ratio, we see almost optimal performance of seq-CC, Monroe, and 5-Geometric, and good performance of PAV, seq-PAV, seq-Phragmén, and 2-Geometric. Minor variations within these groups seem to depend on the chosen dataset and do not persist if parameters are chosen differently. Interestingly, we also observe that 5-Geometric is better than Monroe's rule and seq-CC according to both criteria.
When looking at the three Geometric rules considered here, we see the transition from AV to CC as our theoretical findings predict (cf. Figure 1 ): 1.5-Geometric is close to AV, whereas 5-Geometric resembles CC.
Our results indicate that PAV is the best compromise between AV and CC. Note however that seq-PAV, seq-Phragmén, and 2-Geometric achieve comparable AV-and CC-ratios, and the former two are much cheaper to compute.
An Efficiency Axiom
In this section we provide a complementary axiomatic analysis concerning individual excellence. We formulate the axiom of efficiency, a form of Pareto efficiency with respect to the number of approved candidates in a committee. In other words, this axiom dictates that only committees can be chosen where a further improvement of the total AV-score implies that the AV-score of individual voters is reduced. We analyze our rules with respect to this property, and, maybe surprisingly, show that many rules do not satisfy this axiom.
Definition 3. Consider a committee size k ∈ N, two committees W 1 , W 2 ∈ S k (C) and an approval profile A ∈ A. We say that W 1 dominates W 2 in a A if for each voter i ∈ N we have that |W 1 ∩ A(i)| ≥ |W 2 ∩ A(i)|, and if there exists a voter j such that |W 1 ∩ A(j)| > |W 2 ∩ A(j)|. An ABC rule R satisfies efficiency if for each profile A ∈ A and each committee size k there exists no committee W ∈ S k (C) that dominates each committee in R(A, k).
We start from quite a surprising observation. The following example shows that seq-Phragméndoes not satisfy efficiency. The sequential Phragmén's rule will select c 1 first, c 4 second, and c 5 third, yet committee {c 1 , c 4 , c 5 } is dominated by {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 }. This example also works for the Open d'Hondt method, which can be viewed as another variant of the Phragmén's rule [42] .
We note that the violation of efficiency is not an artifact of the rule being sequential (and so, in some sense "suboptimal"). Indeed, consider the optimal Phragmén's rule, which is the variant where the committee members and their associated load distributions are not chosen sequentially, but rather simultaneously in a single step. Similarly, as in the case of its sequential counterpart, the goal of the optimal Phragmén's rule is to find a committee and an associated load distribution that minimizes the load of the voter with the highest load (for more details on this rule we refer the reader to the work of Brill et al. [11] ). The following example shows that the optimal Phragmén's rule does not satisfy efficiency. The same example shows that the Monroe rule does not satisfy efficiency. For this profile and for k = 2 the greedy Monroe rule first picks c 3 , who is approved by 10 voters, will remove these 10 voters, and will pick c 4 . However, committee {c 3 , c 4 } is dominated by {c 1 , c 2 }. The same example shows that seq-CC and seq-PAV do not satisfy efficiency.
All the remaining rules that we consider satisfy efficiency.
Proposition 8. AV, CC, PAV, and p-geometric satisfy efficiency.
Proof. Let R ∈ {AV, CC, PAV, p-geometric}. For the sake of contradiction let us assume that there exists k ∈ N, profile A ∈ A, and a committee W ∈ S k (C) such that W dominates each committee from R(A, k). In particular, this means that W has strictly lower score than some committee W opt ∈ R(A, k). Thus, there exists a voter i ∈ N that assigns to W opt a higher score than to W . However, this is not possible since for each of the considered rules the score that i assigns to a committee W is an increasing function of |W ∩ A(i)|, a contradiction.
Conclusion and Future Work
Our work demonstrates the flow of ideas from the theoretical computer science to theoretical economics in general, and to mechanism design and social choice, in particular. Specifically, we designed new tools that can be used to assess the level of diversity and individual excellence provided by certain rules. Our work can be extended in several directions. First, we have focused on approval-based multi-winner rules-a natural next step is to perform a similar analysis for multi-winner rules that take rankings over candidates as inputs. Second, we have excluded some interesting voting rules from our analysis, in particular reverse-sequential PAV [47] and Minimax Approval Voting [9] ; it is unclear how they compare to rules considered in this paper. Finally, we have chosen AV and CC as extreme notions that represent diversity and individual excellence. Another natural approach would be to take a proportional rule (such as PAV) as standard and see how well rules approximate PAV and with that proportionality.
